Child Custody and Visitation in Maryland: In the Best Interests of the Child by McGavin, Kim H.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 1 Summer/Fall 1995 Article 2
1995
Child Custody and Visitation in Maryland: In the
Best Interests of the Child
Kim H. McGavin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
McGavin, Kim H. (1995) "Child Custody and Visitation in Maryland: In the Best Interests of the Child," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss1/2
CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION IN MARYLAND: 
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
Kim H. McGavin 
Considerable discussion has taken place recently 
over what is the real meaning of "in the best interests of 
the child" and whether this is an appropriate standard 
for making custody and visitation decisions. Much of 
this debate has focused on the highly divided interests 
ofbiological parents and those of third parties, adoptive 
parents, and biological grandparents. Fortunately, in 
Maryland there is some guidance for establishing prior-
ities. 
Maryland courts apply the "best interests" stan-
dard to custody and visitation determinations. I While 
various presumptions grant certain parties favored sta-
tus in determining custody and visitation rights, the 
overriding mandate under the "best interests" standard 
is for courts to create a custody/visitation arrangement 
which will promote the welfare of the child. The most 
desirable aspect of the "best interests" standard is that 
it focuses the decision-making process on the child's 
psychological and developmental needs, "rather than 
on parental demands, societal stereotypes, or legal 
tradition."2 The flexibility implicit in the standard 
enables courts to be more responsive to the particular 
needs of each case by permitting examination on an 
individual basis. 
There is, however, a lack of uniformity in the 
application of the "best interests" standard. While, 
ideally, the child's developmental and psychological 
needs should be given paramount consideration under 
this standard, in reality those needs are frequently 
subordinated to parental rights as courts struggle both 
to honor legal traditions and respond to changing social 
norms. 
Biological Parent Versus Biological Parent 
In Maryland, as between biological parents, there is 
no presumption that either parent has a superior right 
over the other for the custody of their children. 3 At early 
common law, fathers were entitled to the custody and 
control of their minor children,4 though gradually over 
the nineteenth century many states either adopted the 
doctrine of "tender years," awarding custody of chil-
dren under seven years of age to mothers, or enacted 
laws granting equal rights in custody to both parents. 5 
By the 1920's, various historical trends converged to 
further diminish the paternal preference. 6 Society 
became increasingly concerned with the welfare of 
children during the industrial revolution, and family 
responsibilities became divided between "wage 
earner" and "child nurturer" as fathers sought work 
in cities away from the farm or village. 7 Moreover, 
elevation of women's legal status during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries also contributed to the 
movement from "paternal" to "maternal" prefer-
ence. 8 
Maryland adopted the maternal preference pre-
sumption, considering mothers to be the natural custo-
dians of young children,9 and courts generally granted 
custody to mothers unless they were found to be unfit. 10 
Since 1974, however, the maternal preference doctrine 
has been abolished in Maryland II because it permitted 
the award of custody to the mother solely upon the basis 
of her sex. 12 Today, when determining custody be-
tween biological parents, each stands, at least initially, 
on equal footing before the court. 
Parents may, of course, reach custody and visita-
tion agreements outside of court. These private 
agreements may be advantageous because they 
allow parents to determine which arrangements will 
best serve the needs of the child, satisfy 
parental desires, and maintain family values while 
preserving the family's economic resources. 13 Unfor-
tunately, oftentimes parents create these agreements 
without knowledge of options available to them. 
Moreover, parents do not demonstrate much foresight 
in planning for long-term eventualities. 14 In addition, 
such agreements are subject to modification by the 
court which will decide whether the provisions con-
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tained therein truly are in the best interests of the child. 15 
Maryland courts consider a multitude of factors 
when determining whether any given custody/visitation 
arrangement will serve the child's best interest. Includ-
ed among these factors are: abuse or neglect of the 
child,16 adultery, 17 cohabitation,18 desires of the child, 19 
fitness of the parents,20 character and conduct of the 
parties,21 age, health, and sex of the child,22 the desires 
of the natural parents and any agreements between 
them,23 the potential for maintaining natural family 
relations,24 material opportunities affecting the child's 
future,25 and prior voluntary abandonment or surren-
der.26 The court's most difficult task lies in ascertaining 
and weighing all of the pertinent factors. Maryland 
courts have wide discretion in determining, on a case by 
case basis, which factors will be considered and how 
much weight will be given anyone of them. Although 
it appears from case law that no one factor, by itself, 
would be adequate for a denial of custody or visitation, 
it is difficult to know precisely what combination of 
factors the court would find sufficient. 
Regardless of which parent is awarded custody, the 
noncustodial parent is usually permitted visitation priv-
ileges. The term "child visitation right" is used to 
denote a noncustodial, biological parent's natural and 
legal right to see his or her child. 27 This right, however, 
is not an absolute right in that (1) courts may refuse to 
uphold it when its exercise would be detrimental to the 
child,28 and (2) it may be terminated pursuant to a 
confidential adoption. 29 Generally, a noncustodial par-
ent's visitation right may not be terminated absent 
compliance with statutory procedures and a formal 
court decree,30 nor may he or she be non-judicially 
deprived of it, by the custodial parent, for failure to pay 
child support or alimony.31 
Private agreements forfeiting visitation rights may 
not be upheld if, in the court's determination, a resump-
tion ofthe parent-child relationship is in the best interest 
of the child. Such agreements may even be held void as 
against Maryland's public policy that continuance of the 
parent-child relationship, absent extraordinary circum-
stances, is in the child's best interest. 
Under Maryland law, a presumption exists that a 
child will benefit most by continued association with the 
noncustodial, biological parent. So strong is this pre-
sumption that, alone, none of the following conditions 
have been found to be so detrimental to the child as to 
preclude a parent from exercising his or her visitation 
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rights: sexual or other immoral conduct,32 failure to 
attend visitation sessions,33 threats or acts of physical or 
sexual abuse,34 alcoholism,35 conviction of a serious 
criminal offense,36 failure to pay child support and 
alimony,37 abandonment or lapse of time between vis-
its,38 derogatory remarks made by one parent about the 
other parent,39 removal of the child from the jurisdic-
tion,40 and differing religious views. 41 
Maryland courts have not, to date, completely 
denied visitation rights to a noncustodial parent. In the 
case of physical or sexual abuse, it seems paradoxical 
for a court to determine that a child is best served by 
continued association with his or her abuser, especially 
since courts claim to give paramount consideration to 
the welfare of the child when weighing the interests of 
each. Court decisions granting visitation to abusive, 
noncustodial parents are also troubling in light of the 
modest deference given to the desires of the child.42 
While the principal reason for granting visitation is the 
perceived benefit to the child, forcing a reluctant child 
to visit an abusive parent may be detrimental to the 
child's emotional and psychological well-being.43 
At once, Maryland courts claim that (1) the child's 
best interest is of paramount consideration,44 (2) paren-
tal rights "sink into insignificance" in relation to the 
child's best interests,45 and (3) that a parent's right to 
visitation will be denied only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances.46 Under this framework, courts contend 
that the interests ofthe parents are subordinate to those 
of the child, yet the child's interests actually become 
subservient to t~e parent's right to a continuing rela-
tionship. Often what is in the best interest of the child 
is severance of the parent-child relationship, but courts 
are so reluctant to terminate parental rights that they 
are, in fact, merely searching for the least detrimental 
alternative. 
Courts in Maryland recognize that, generally, a 
child's best interest is served by continued association 
with his or her natural parent. Research has demonstrat-
ed "a positive relationship between a child's self-
esteem and continued contact with the noncustodial 
parent; the greater the contact, the higher the sense of 
self-esteem. "47 The benefits derived from encouraging 
parent-child visitation go beyond the possibility of 
promoting a child's self-esteem or providing parental 
love and companionship. Rather, even in cases where 
the noncustodial parent is not a "good" parent, parent-
child visitation should still be pursued inasmuch as 
"sooner or later [the child] must see [the parent] in 
accurate perspective and eliminate whatever fantasies 
he may have had. "48 
To do justice under the "best interests" standard, 
courts must endeavor to learn what the actual interests 
of the child are rather than rely on various presumptions 
regarding those interests.49 In balancing parental rights 
against the child's actual interests, courts need to be 
more concerned with assessing the practical impact of 
visitation, placing greater weight on the desires of an 
abused child in particular, and less concerned with 
upholding parental rights. 
Biological Parents Versus Third Persons 
Though in Maryland the custody claim of one parent 
is not given preference to that of the other, biological 
parents still enjoy superiority over claims made by third 
persons. A presumption exists that the child is best 
served by reposing custody in the natural parents.50 
Custody may, however, be granted to remote members 
of the family or to non-biological third persons when 
the court has found the natural parents to be unfit or if 
exceptional circumstances exist which would make 
placement with the natural parents detrimental to the 
child's welfare. 51 
Questions of parental fitness generally fall within 
the following categories: moral fitness;52 psychological 
or emotional fitness;53 prior conduct affecting the child's 
physical, psychological, and financial needs;54 and love 
and affection for the child including willingness and 
ability to care for the child.55 Although historically 
courts took a moralistic view in examining parental 
conduct, 56 today such conduct seems to be considered 
only in light of its effect on the child. If a parent's 
conduct is not found to adversely affect the child or 
diminish the quality of care a child receives, then a 
parent will, most likely, not be deemed unfit. 57 
Factors which may be of probative value in deter-
mining whether "exceptional circumstances" exist in-
clude: the length of time the child has been away from 
the natural parent, the age of the child when care was 
assumed by the third person, the period of time which 
elapsed before the natural parent sought to reclaim the 
child, the emotional impact on the child created by a 
change in custody, the sincerity and intensity of the 
natural parent's desire to have the child, the stability and 
certainty regarding the child's future if placed in the 
custody of the natural parent, and the nature and 
strength ofties between the child and the third person. 58 
In making custody decisions between biological 
parents and third persons, courts are frequently con-
fronted with the concept of "psychological parent." 
The "psychological parent" theory, advocated by 
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit in 
their 1973 book, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, 
suggests that once a child has been separated from his 
or her natural parents for a sufficient length oftime, any 
bonds oflove or affection between the child and his or 
her natural parents will weaken. 59 Simultaneously, a 
strong psychological tie will develop between the child 
and the third person.60 The third person becomes the 
child's "psychological parent," the person to whom the 
child looks for security, love, physical care, nourish-
ment, and a sense of emotional well-being. 61 Once this 
bond is formed, removal ofthe child from the "psycho-
logical parent" is thought to cause the child severe 
emotional trauma.62 Theoretically, a child under five 
years of age, separated from his biological parent for 
two months, will sever his emotional ties to his biolog-
ical parent and forge an allegiance to his "psychological 
parent." Separation from the "psychological parent" 
and return to the biological parent after this two month 
period, presumably, will be detrimental to the child's 
best interests.63 Similar correlations factoring the age of 
the child, time apart from the natural parent, and 
formation of the "psychological parent" bond can be 
used as a basis for determining whether a return of the 
child to the natural parent's custody will serve the 
child's best interests. 
Maryland courts have been reluctant to embrace the 
"psychological parent" argument in child custody cas-
es. In Montgomery County Dep 't of Social Servs. v. 
Sanders,64 the court rejected the notion that its custody 
decision should be made on the basis ofthe "psycholog-
ical parent" concept. 65 The court believed that accep-
tance ofthe "psychological parent" principle would be 
tantamount to adopting a mathematical process by 
which custody could be determined by measuring the 
child's age and time apart from his biological parents.66 
To do so would place the court in the position of 
"rubber stamping" determinations made by psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists utilizing this formula. "Custody 
cases involve too many people, conditions, and human 
emotions to be reduced summarily to a mere mathemat-
ical process. "67 
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Consistent with the Sanders decision, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, in Lipiano v. Lipiano,68 
refused to distinguish between various degrees of third 
persons such as "natural" parents and "equitable" 
parents. 69 While rejecting these distinctions, the court, 
however, acknowledged that the closeness of the rela-
tionship between a child and a third person would be a 
factor to be considered in determining whether "excep-
tional circumstances" existed, thus warranting place-
ment of the child in the custody of the third person. 70 
In summary, as between biological parents and third 
persons, custody with the biological parents is pre-
sumed to be in the best interest of the child. It is a 
rebuttable presumption which places the burden on the 
third person to show that either the parent is unfit or that 
exceptional circumstances exist which make placement 
with the third person preferable.71 
Should a child be returned to his or her biological 
parent, a third person may have difficulty in securing 
visitation privileges inasmuch as (1) there is no pre-
sumption, as with natural parents, that continuation of 
the relationship is in the child's best interest, and (2) 
there is no statute granting visitation rights as is avail-
able for the child's grandparents. However, since a 
court has the power to place custody with a third person 
when it deems it to be in the child's best interest, that 
power may well permit a court to grant visitation to 
third persons under appropriate circumstances. On the 
other hand, when a child is taken from his natural 
parents and placed in the custody of third persons, 
visitation by natural parents may be granted by the court 
if it is deemed to be in the best interest of the child. 72 
Grandparental Custody and Visitation Rights 
As between biological parents and biological grand-
parents, Maryland courts prefer placing custody of 
children with their biological parents. 73 Maryland courts 
will only grant custody to a grandparent, over the 
desires of the natural parents, in exceptional circum-
stances.74 An equity court in Maryland may, however, 
grant a petition permitting grandparents to visit their 
grandchildren if it is deemed to be in the best interests 
of the child. 75 
Interestingly, effective October 1, 1993, an Amend-
ment to section 9-102 of the Family Law Article of the 
Maryland Annotated Code deleted from the former 
statute the introductory phrase, "[a]t any time after the 
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termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment or 
death" and also deleted from subsection (1) the phrase 
"of a natural or adopted child of the parties whose 
marriage has been terminated" and inserted "of a 
grandchild" following "grandparent." The revised 
statute states that "[ a]n equity court may: (1) consider 
a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a 
grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best 
interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the 
grandparent." These changes seem to effect the result 
that grandparents now enjoy a separate right of visit a-
tion, for adopted or natural grandchildren, independent 
of the disposition of the marital union. 76 
Prior to the change, significant ambiguity existed as 
to whether a grandparent only had standing to petition 
for visitation ifit were in connection with the termina-
tion of a marriage by divorce, annulment or death. 
Maryland courts, however, refused to give such a 
narrow reading to the former statute and instead, in 
1984, indicated that visitation could be permitted under 
these circumstances (termination of marriage by di-
vorce, annulment or death), but that the statute "does 
not limit the power of a court as to custody and 
visitation by grandparents under other circumstances" 
(emphasis added). n This interpretation permitted courts 
to grant petitions to grandparents to visit their grand-
children whether or not the marital union terminated. 
Ostensibly, it also made possible the grant of petitions 
to grandparents for visitation with natural grandchil-
dren who become adopted by third persons. 
Such broad discretion was reigned in, however, 
when the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ruled in 
L.F.M v. Department of Social Servs., 78 that when "the 
rights of the natural parents have been terminated and 
a child has been placed for confidential adoption, the 
courts of this state are not empowered to award visita-
tion to the child's natural family over the objection of the 
guardian with the right to consent to adoption and the 
prospective adoptive parents.'79 Under this ruling, 
grandparents, who acquire their visitation rights through 
the child's natural parents, are included in the court's 
use of the phrase "child's natural family." Maryland 
courts then had no power, despite the statute, to grant 
grandparents visitation rights should their grandchil-
dren subsequently become adopted. 
On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland remedied this dilemma by its ruling in In re 
Adoption No. 92A 4]80 that "adoption does not auto-
matically vitiate the grandparental visitation rights," 
and holding that section 5-308 of the Family Law 
Article ofthe Maryland Annotated Code only severs the 
rights of a living natural parent and does not affect the 
rights of the parent's mother or father. 81 
The broadness of the language in the revised statute 
taken together with the ruling of In re Adoption No. 
92A41, makes possible further challenges between the 
rights of adoptive parents and the visitation privileges of 
grandparents. Under present statutory and case law, it 
appears that if visitation by the grandparents would be 
in the best interests of the child, Maryland courts may 
be empowered to grant it even over the objection ofthe 
adoptive parents. 82 
Biological Parents Versus Adoptive Parents 
From a sociological viewpoint, adoptions are desir-
able mechanisms for providing children with opportu-
nities to be raised in families capable of providing them 
with the love, care, support, and nurturing they need. 
Adoptions also provide biological parents with a means 
by which they may secure the care oftheir children when 
they themselves are either incapable, unfit, or unwilling 
to do SO.83 Moreover, adults who are otherwise unable 
to have children are permitted an opportunity to enter 
parenthood, gaining both the rights and responsibilities 
of natural parents. 
To facilitate the achievement of these societal goals, 
state legislatures have enacted various laws governing 
adoptions. In Maryland, adoption does not exist at 
common law. 84 Instead, adoption is governed by sec-
tion 5, subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article of the 
Maryland Annotated Code which seeks to protect the 
interests of the child, natural parents, and adoptive 
parents. Maryland statutes endeavor to (1) protect 
children from "unnecessary separation from their nat-
ural parents ... and ... [from] adoption by individuals who 
are unfit for the responsibility,"85 (2) protect "natural 
parents from a hurried or ill-considered decision to give 
up a child,"86 and (3) protect adoptive parents "by 
providing them information about the child and the 
child's background ... and ... from a future disturbance 
of their relationship with the child by a natural parent."81 
Under Maryland law, "[a]ny adult may petition a 
court to decree an adoption,"88 and "[a]ny individual, 
whether a minor or an adult, may be adopted."89 
Maryland courts have even permitted the adoption of a 
child by one natural parent without the consent of the 
other. 90 Adoptions, however, may not be accomplished 
in Maryland absent compliance with statutory proce-
dures and a formal judicial decree.91 
Adoption Procedures 
In order to grant an adoption, a Maryland court 
must generally have the consent of both natural parents 
as well as the consent of the individual to be adopted, if 
that individual is at least ten years of age.92 Natural 
parents and judicially appointed guardians may revoke 
their consent either within thirty calendar days after the 
filing of the consent or prior to the entry of a final 
adoption decree, whichever occurs first. 93 The individ-
ual to be adopted may withdraw his or her consent at any 
time before either an interlocutory or final adoption 
decree is entered.94 Under certain circumstances, a 
court may order an adoption without the consent ofthe 
natural parents,95 but because the consequences of 
adoption are so severe for natural parents, it will not do 
so unless clearly determined to be in the best interests 
of the child. 96 
Once the formal court decree is issued, "each living 
natural parent ofthe individual adopted" is relieved of 
"all parental duties and obligations" and is also divest-
ed of "all parental rights. "91 The adopted child be-
comes, for all intents and purposes, the child of the 
adoptive parents, and "is entitled to all the rights and 
privileges of and is subj ect to all the obligations of a child 
born to the [adoptive parents] in wedlock. "98 A legal 
relationship is established between the adoptive parents 
and the child which serves as a complete substitute for 
the relationship the child had with his or her biological 
parents. 99 Accordingly, all rights and duties of the 
natural parents, including the rights of custody and 
visitation, become the rights and duties of the adoptive 
parents. 100 The rights of adoptive parents, however, like 
those of natural parents, are not absolute but must yield 
to the best interests of the child. 101 
Under Maryland Rule 625(a), courts have the pow-
er to revise or modify an adoption decree for thirty days 
after the entry of the final order. While interlocutory 
and final decrees or orders are appealable under section 
5-330 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland 
Annotated Code, jurisdictional and procedural chal-
lenges to the validity of a final adoption decree must be 
filed within one year. 102 After these periods have 
26.1 / U. Bait. L.F. - 7 
elapsed, final adoption decrees may only be invalidated 
in Maryland on the bases of fraud, mistake, or irregular-
ity in obtainment; otherwise, the decree is deemed final 
and binding. 103 The court record is then sealed and may 
only be opened by order of the court. I04 
Privacy of Adoption Records 
Foreclosing access to adoption records advances 
the goals of protecting natural parents from disclosure 
of the circumstances surrounding the child's birth, 
shelters most adoptees from the stigma of illegitimacy, 
enhances the opportunity for adoptive parents to raise 
the child unhindered by the natural parents,105 assists 
with emotional and psychological closure for mothers 
who have experienced an unwanted pregnancy, and 
permits the natural parents to go on with their lives 
secure in the beliefthat the child will not return to invade 
their privacy. 106 Such a guarantee of confidentiality and 
anonymity, arguably, enhances and strengthens the 
adoption system,107 and is consistent with the idea that 
the adoptive relationship is a complete substitute for the 
biological relationship. However, the concept of com-
plete substitution is only a legal fiction as these relation-
ships are only identical in the legal sense. Adopted 
children have shown a strong psychological need to 
learn about their biological origins. 108 Such children 
often experience greater difficulty in establishing a 
sense of identity. 109 Courts must begin to recognize the 
inherent needs of adopted children, respecting a child's 
right to know and preserve his or her true, biological 
identity. 
Yet, courts have never recognized childrens' rights 
as being coextensive to those of adults. Children are 
especially vulnerable to exploitation and mistreatment, 
and children are unable to make certain decisions in a 
rational and mature manner. I 10 Denying access to 
information concerning the identity of the adopted 
child's natural parents may be justified while the child is 
a minor, but when an adopted child becomes an adult, 
he or she is no longer in need of the court's special 
protection. III 
Granting a child an opportunity to discover the 
identity of his or her natural parents is not necessarily 
detrimental to either the child or the adoption system. 
In cases other than adoption, when custody is reposed 
in persons other than the natural parent, the parent-child 
relationship is deemed to be so beneficial to the child 
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that visitation rights are not denied to even the most 
errant parent. Denial of access to the identity of natural 
parents after an adoption, therefore, seems incongruent 
and appears to place the interests of the natural par-
ents, 112 adoptive parents, 113 and the Statel14 above those 
of the child. These competing interests may, neverthe-
less, be protected, though subordinated to those of the 
child, by creating a system which would permit access 
to the adoption records by a third party intermediary 
once the child has reached the age ofmajority or, if while 
a minor, with the adoptive parents' consent. A deter-
mination may be made as to the actual desires of the 
biological parents, rather than assuming they want 
secrecy.1I5 Birth mothers often never come to terms 
with the emotional consequences of their decision to 
give up a child, and many natural parents are not adverse 
to a reunion with their children. 116 
F ears of adoptive parents may be allayed inasmuch 
as natural parents, by virtue of the adoption decree, 
have been divested of their rights to make decisions 
regarding the child. Furthermore, adoptive parents, 
exercising custodial rights, may chaperone as well as 
limit the number and duration of visits with the natural 
parents. Moreover, once adopted childrenreach major-
ity' adoptive parents have realized their desire to raise 
their "child" without interference from the natural 
parents. 
The State's interest in promoting and protecting the 
adoption system, by guaranteeing confidentiality to 
natural parents, is protected by giving natural parents an 
opportunity to maintain their privacy by refusing to 
consent to the opening of the sealed records. In such 
cases, disclosure ofthe natural parents' identity may be 
denied upon a balancing of the interests by the court. 
In Maryland, absent a private agreement between 
the natural and adoptive parents, 117 visitation between 
the adopted child and his or her natural parents ceases 
upon entry of the final adoption decree. Such private 
agreements will be upheld provided they are in the best 
interests of the child and are not violative of public 
policy.1I8 While Maryland courts will enforce these 
private agreements, they may not be able to order 
visitation because to do so may prove contrary to 
statutes severing parental rightsl19 as well as those 
protecting adoptive parents from interference by natu-
ral parents. 120 
Recently, battles waged by biological parents seek-
ing to reclaim custody of their adopted children have 
surged to the forefront offamily law. At issue in these 
cases is whether the child's interests will be best served 
by retaining custody in the adoptive parents or returning 
the child to the custody of his or her natural parents. In 
cases where a child has been in the custody of the 
adoptive parents for a significant length of time and is 
receiving proper care, the need to provide a high degree 
of certainty to final adoption decrees,121 most likely, 
outweighs any benefits to be derived by returning 
custody to the child's natural parents. 122 For the most 
part, courts have found that a child has a greater interest 
in the stability of the adoption decree than in his or her 
relationship with either the biological or adoptive par-
ents.123 
Interests of the Child and Parent 
A child has fundamental interests in the love, nurtur-
ing, support, and society of both parents; continuity of 
family relationships; accessibility to both parents; free-
dom to love both parents; certainty and stability with 
regard to his or her home, school, and community; 
freedom from physical, psychological, and sexual abuse; 
freedom from exploitation; having and preserving an 
identity, a name, and a nationality; knowing his or her 
parents; and not being separated from his or her parents 
against their will. 
Subject to the interest and authority ofthe State to 
protect children from abuse and neglect, 124 each natural 
parent has an interest in the love and companionship of 
his or her child; the custody of his or her child; 125 the 
services and earnings ofthe child; 126 raising the child free 
of interference by third persons; 127 and the right to visit 
the child if deprived of custody. 128 
In fashioning custody and visitation arrangements, 
courts should take into consideration each of these 
interests under the mandate of the ""best interests" 
standard. There is a wonderful freedom for courts, 
under this standard, to do what is best for the child at 
what is probably the most difficult time in the child's life. 
"Precedents and theories should never control the 
decision of a custody or adoption case since the answer 
to the question of what is for the best interests and 
welfare of the child necessarily depends on judgment 
applied to a set of facts and circumstances which, like 
the proverbial will, has no twin brother."129 
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